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While many existing taxonomies and frameworks provide a common vocabulary
for describing how human operators fail in the context of sociotechnical systems,
at present, there is no common vocabulary to describe how humans succeed. Such
a framework would facilitate systematically collecting and analyzing data on how
human performance can produce safety, not just how it can reduce safety. One
potentially rich source of currently available information for exploring desired
performance is the reports submitted to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting
System (ASRS). These de-identified, confidential, and voluntary narrative reports
are submitted by pilots, controllers, ground operators, and others within aviation
operations. While these reports are primarily submitted to describe safety risks,
incidents, and problems, they also often describe how those risks were mitigated,
and provide a window into aspects of everyday work in aviation. This paper
describes an analysis of ASRS narratives to understand how operators talk about
their own resilient behaviors during adverse safety conditions and events. Guided
by Erik Hollnagel’s Resilience Assessment Grid framework (i.e., anticipate,
monitor, respond, learn), we illustrate our approach and methodology with
examples from reports. We also highlight some of the challenges and how further
research is needed in developing a taxonomy of operators’ descriptions of
resilient performance.
Safety has largely been viewed and defined by examination of threats, errors, and
undesirable behaviors. Although most of the time things go right, there are no common methods
to collect information from operations when they do, and there is no common vocabulary that
exists to discuss these successful behaviors nor taxonomy to organize them. However, one
potentially rich source of currently available information to learn about resilient performance is
reports submitted to the ASRS. These de-identified, confidential, and voluntary narrative reports
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are submitted by pilots, controllers, ground operators, and others within aviation operations.
These reports present an opportunity to look at “small” (incidents not accidents) but frequent
events in everyday work.
Operators submit reports to ASRS typically after something went wrong. Pilots’
behaviors that result in successfully handling complex situations may often not be reported, as
they are likely viewed as part of their job. Our premise is that nearly every ASRS report
demonstrates resilient potential(s) and is an example of positive outcomes, since operators
survived the event and were able to write the report. Terms such as “resilience” or being
“resilient” are not currently part of the language of how operators talk about their own
performance in ASRS reports, despite descriptions that clearly demonstrate resilience.
Resilience, described in a general way, is an adaptive capacity that contributes to
successful outcomes. Looking at resilience can increase our understanding of how safety is
produced and where to focus safety training efforts. Detecting resilient performance in these
reports was guided by Erik Hollnagel’s Resilience Assessment Grid framework (Hollnagel,
2015). Hollnagel identifies four potentials that are necessary for resilient performance. A
system’s resilience is described by its potential to: Anticipate (knowing what to expect,
anticipating disruptions, new or changing situations), Monitor (knowing what to look for in one’s
performance as well as in the environment), Respond (knowing what to do, respond to changes
and adjust), and Learn (knowing what happened, learning from the experience, and learning the
right lessons). In ASRS reports, these potentials manifest themselves in behaviors. These
descriptions of behaviors can be analyzed and identified (or labeled) as resilience potentials.
Method
The ASRS database can be searched in a variety of ways. The database is vast, with
currently over a million and a half reports in its repository, and growing by the hundreds on a
daily basis. Searches can result in thousands of reports to review which can be labor intensive
and time consuming. Descriptions of resilient performance can also include more than key words
and phrases. Key word searches can be informative, but can fail to detect resilient behaviors that
are not specifically named. Refined investigations can include using combinations of selected
keywords, phrases, filters, codes (e.g., ASRS coding taxonomy), and/or focusing on specific
targeted situations or events (e.g., Chandra et al., 2020). With the quantity of data contained in
narratives, software tools may facilitate and enhance searches and analysis. For example, some
software programs can be utilized as discovery tools (e.g., based upon frequency of terms in
documents) or as query tools (e.g., based upon searching for similar documents that have a
shared context). Ongoing research efforts continue to explore the possibilities and limitations of
various tools for analyzing data from ASRS reports. Using such tools for ASRS data analysis has
been conducted (Paradis, et al., 2021) but further investigations are necessary.
Using Hollnagel’s framework, Holbrook et al. (2019) identified resilient performance
strategies, employed in routine aviation contexts, as a way to organize identified behaviors, for
each of the four potentials. For example, for the Learn potential, Holbrook et al. identifed four
strategies: 1) Leverage experience and learning to modify or deviate from plan., 2) Understand
formal expectations., 3) Facilitate others’ learning., and 4) Conduct after-action debriefing.
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These strategies can be used to identify and code operators’ statements. To illustrate our
approach and to address some of its challenges, specific statements from selected reports are
used as examples below, with accompanying notations and explanations. Examples #1-4 come
from ASRS report #1516535.
Example #1
“Assigned CHSLY3 RNAV Star into CLT, FO was PF, I was PM... FO had checked ATIS and
noted that Runway 23 was in use. He also mentioned at that time that since Runway 23 is on the
ATIS we would most likely get that runway from our direction. So FMC was planned with
Runway 23 during cruise…”
Based on the proposed coding scheme, the First Officer (FO) is both Anticipating and
Learning through conducting a pre-action briefing, leveraging his experience, and facilitating
others’ learning (FO to Captain [CA]). He discusses the planned action and identifies the
variable that affects the plan. The CA describes how the FO anticipated what to expect, and
compared his experience to the current situation to develop real-time assessment and to modify
the plan. Since neither crew member used the word Anticipate or Learn in the narrative, this
report would not be returned using those resilient terms in a keyword search (although a search
using the keyword “Respond” would return this report, because it appears later in the narrative).
Another issue is that the action of the FO can be identified as both Anticipate and Learn. The
coding scheme does not account for strategies that fit into more than one potential. One strategy
may be described by both potentials, or even be associated with or linked to another potential
(e.g, Learning leads to Anticipating). Hollnagel describes this as “the interdependence of the
potentials”. Similarly, Kiernan et al. (2020) describes these enablers of resilient performance as
“exhaustive but not mutually exclusive”. The same words can represent different strategies
depending on context, and different words can represent the same strategy. This makes such
coding challenging, particularly when developing a taxonomy to group data in a meaningful and
systematic way.
Example #2
“At about that time the FO asked what should I do? I said start slowing.”
In this situation, the Learning opportunity occurs between the FO and the CA. The CA is
facilitating the FO’s learning. This strategy is described as, “sharing information with others to
increase their immediate understanding and long-term learning” (Holbrook et al., 2019).
Individuals bring with them their past experience and knowledge, which affects their actions, so
determining the source of the Learning may require further investigation in this work. This is
evident in the next example.
Example #3
“I have found out the hard way that this aircraft will not come down and slow down
simultaneously. Phone call with OPD guy was enlightening as he says this is a huge ongoing
issue...”
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Though he doesn’t go into detail about “the hard way”, the CA is describing his Learning
through experience, and his Learning is further facilitated through his conversation with a
colleague.
Example #4
“Approach saw our problem and said nicely, I'm going to spin you around and get you back on a
heading to intercept localizer for 23.”
The opportunity to Anticipate, Monitor, and Respond is attributed to the Approach air
traffic controller (ATC). ATC anticipates and notices the problem, and adjusts the current plan.
ATC monitored the crew’s ability to make the descent, with cues signaling a change from normal
or expected operations. This statement depicts the role of ATC and describes how different
actors contribute to resilience in the system. Another method of evaluating resilience in ASRS
reports can focus the analysis on the turning points and triggers of an event. In this situation, it
was ATC that changed the course of the flight.
Example #5 (ASRS #1741671)
“…I called for a Go Around… the Go Around was done to look at a problem…Captain decided
to keep Flaps 1 .. to avoid a potential emergency gear extension procedure…Crew Established
and Communicated a plan that entailed to [advise] with ATC to have CFR in place and RWY
priority in [if] necessary. We communicated our intentions with flight attendants and advised
passengers and Dispatch. We requested delay vectors to run the required QRH Decent
Checklist…We followed the QRH procedures, and [advised ATC], requested fire rescue to be
ready…Captain..decided to stop on runway to have CFR look over outside of aircraft… I
decided that taxi was too difficult…and requested a tow…Crew debriefed for clarification, any
issues and ways procedure/crew actions could be improved.
An FO complied with a CA’s call for a go-around while handling a loss of hydraulic
fluid. The Captain was Monitoring and Responding to a rapidly changing situation, and called
for a go-around. The operators describe several strategies during and after the incident that
indicate resilient performance. They also include some explanations of their understanding,
communication process, assumptions, and motivations. Narrative self-reports can provide this
kind of information.
Actions are often judged based on the subsequent outcome. However, the decision to call
for a go-around may be appropriate in one situation, but not in the next. Had the outcome been
poor, a go-around would not be considered “desired” performance, but the capabilities to
anticipate the need, monitor for relevant cues, and adjust the flight by executing a go-around all
contribute to the potential for resilient performance. Furthermore, some operators are very
explicit in describing what they were Anticipating, or were Monitoring for, etc., but other times
these descriptions are implicit. Thus, reading for a deeper understanding of the meaning in
context and the subtle nuances can increase insight.
Example #6 (ASRS #1759282)
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[Leg 1] “I read the clearance back and wrote down "HFR" at the bottom of my clearance…”
[Leg 2] “I put the checklist between the throttles to remind me and verbally repeated "Hold for
Release" on every radio call on CTAF frequency.”
By leveraging his experience and managing available resources, pilot Learning and
Responding occurred between two flight legs in this narrative. The flight crew received a Hold
for Release (HFR) due to a maintenance delay, so the pilot wrote this down as a reminder. Bag
loading was completed, and the flight crew started the engines, taxied, and took off. However,
they took off without receiving ATC clearance. The pilot recognized the risk of forgetting the
clearance from the first leg and so, to prevent this from happening again on the next leg where
they again receive an HFR, devised additional memory cues by putting the checklist between the
throttles, and by repeating the phrase to keep the information active in working memory. These
reports can provide Learning opportunities for both individuals and organizations. The examples
above provide an opportunity to learn how operators describe their own resilient performance,
and illustrate the complexity of labeling and coding these behaviors.
Discussion
There is no common vocabulary to describe how humans succeed, and a method to
systematically capture success does not yet exist. Taxonomies can be created in many different
ways and for many different purposes (e.g., Operator’s Guide to Human Factors in Aviation,
2010; International Civil Aviation Organization Accident/Incident Data Reporting System
Taxonomy, 2013). Our analysis highlights the challenges in determining how to capture and
group expressions of resilient performance meaningfully into a taxonomy that could be useful for
both machine analysis of the data and support human analysis.
In creating a framework that increases understanding and where to focus safety training
efforts, it may be helpful to determine both who and what it was that created the opportunity for
resilience or directly contributed to resilient performance: Was it an individual, a flight crew
team, or a procedure created by the organization? And what did it or they do to contribute to
resilience? This may help in learning what kind of support is needed to promote resilient
performance as operators do their jobs and within the organization. It is worth considering
Vesel’s (2020) descriptions of the challenges and biases present in attributing causality in an
event, particularly in written investigation reports. Vesel addresses the biases, linguistic framing
and shortcuts that occur which can hinder safety promoting efforts. Attempting to “fit human
action into preset, limited categories,” such as in a taxonomy is an example. Vesel proposes ways
to increase the opportunities for learning by looking at the context of an event and the
interrelations between factors.
Conclusion
Operators describe their resilient performance in ASRS reports in many ways. Operators’
narratives provide descriptions of resilient performance, even for reports intended to describe
something that went wrong. In the above examples, the resilient potentials of Anticipate,
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Monitor, Respond, and Learn are present in operators’ descriptions. Hollnagel’s framework
created opportunities for identifying resilient performance, yet presented new challenges.
Machine learning (ML) and natural language processing (NLP) applications may also be helpful
in the analysis of large datasets, but the assumptions and implications of using search and query
tools for the ASRS database must be understood. An interesting avenue currently being explored
is “sentiment analysis.” It utilizes NLP techniques to detect emotions and tones in written text,
which may be useful in helping to identify expressions of positive, resilient human behaviors.
Addressing the present challenges in future research can enable further learning from operators’
safety producing behaviors and resilient performance.
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